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I. INTRODUCTION
After assuming leadership of the Soviet Union in March 1985, Com-
munist Party General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev made reconstruc-
tion (perestroika) of the economic system his principal domestic policy
objective.' In blunt speeches throughout the country, he repeatedly
called for a "revolutionary" restructuring of the economy to: 1) achieve
greater efficiency in production; 2) introduce new methods of manage-
ment; and 3) increase the quantity, quality, and variety of consumer
goods.2 To achieve these objectives, a number of steps were taken during
Gorbachev's first years in office. The government implemented major
personnel changes in its leadership,3 improved wage incentives for work-
ers,4 and reduced sales of alcohol.' The Law on Individual Enterprise
was also enacted,6 allowing individuals to establish independent busi-
1 For an analysis of the Soviet economy, Gorbachev's efforts to reform it, and the risks he faces,
see M. GOLDMAN, GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE (1987); Draper, Soviet Reformers: From Lenin to
Gorbachev, DISSENT, Summer 1987, at 287; Gorbachev's Gamble, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1987, § 6
(Magazine), at 28; Galbraith, Can the Russians Reform?, HARPERS, June 1987, at 52; Kennedy,
What Gorbachev Is Up Against, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1987, at 29; Gorbachev's Great Push and
the Reluctant Public, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1986, at Al, col. 1; Reforming the Soviet Economy, Bus.
WK., Dec. 7, 1987, at 76 [hereinafter Reforming]; For Moscow and Being, Air is Filled with Change,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1987, at Al, col. 1; Uncertain Soviet Marks Milestone, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1,
1987, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
2 See Report by M, S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU [Communist Party of the
Soviet Union] Central Committee, at the Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee on June 25,
1987, translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 27, July 29, 1987, at 3; Speech by M.S.
Gorbachev at a Meeting with the Latvian Republic's Party, Soviet and Economic Aktiv, translated in
39 CURRENT DIG. SOy. PRESS No. 8, Mar. 25, 1987, at 6; On Restructuring and the Party's Person-
nel Policy, translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 4, Feb. 25, 1987, at 1.
Excerpts from Gorbachev's speeches have been frequently printed in the United States press.
See, eg., Gorbachev Makes His Push for the Good Life, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1987, at E3, col. 1;
Gorbachev on the Future: 'We Will Not Give In' N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1986, at A20, col. 1,
Gorbachev's Uphill Struggle, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, Aug. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
3 See Biographies of New Politburo Members, translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No.
26, July 29, 1987, at 5; Communique of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union, translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 4, Feb. 25, 1987, at 4.
Brief biographies of some of the new appointees can be found in Gorbachev Policy Gains as 3
Allies Advance in Party, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1987, at 1, col. 1; In the Gorbachev Mold, N.Y. Times,
June 27, 1987, at 5, col. 1; Gorbachev Foe Loses Politburo Post, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1987, at A6, col.
4.
4 See also Income Distribution and Justice, translated in 38 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 45,
Dec. 10, 1986, at 6; Earned Pay--The Reform of the Pay System Begins, translated in 38 CURRENT
DIG. Soy. PRESS No. 24, July 16, 1986, at 1; Soviet Moves to Pay More to Better Workers, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 8, 1987, at 8, col. 1; Restructuring and Wages, translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. SOV.
PRESS No. 37, Oct. 14, 1987, at 9.
5 See Fighting Alcohol. A Two Year Update, translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS No. 22,
July 1, 1987, at 7; They've Been Covered, translated in 38 CURRENT DIG. SoY. PRESS No. 17, May
28, 1986, at 7. The reasons for the high rate of alcoholism in the Soviet Union and its effect on
society and the economy are discussed in M. BINYON, LIFE IN RUSSIA 59 (1983).
6 The policy of permitting limited private enterprise can be traced back to the New Economic
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nesses for manufacturing certain consumer goods and performing repair
services. The most important step, however, was taken at a special ses-
sion of the Communist Party's ("Party") Central Committee in June
1987. At that session, the Party approved and the Supreme Soviet rati-
fied the Law on the State Enterprise.7 This law involved the most exten-
sive changes in the Soviet economy since the Stalinist era.8
An important element in efforts to restructure the Soviet economy is
improvement of the quality of consumer and industrial goods and serv-
ices. Gorbachev emphasized this concern in his keynote address to the
Twenty-Seventh Soviet Party Congress in February 1986. He sharply
criticized poor production practices and economic inefficiency, and de-
manded radical improvements in the quality of consumer goods, technol-
ogy, and industrial programs.9 The 1986 to 1990 "Five-Year Plan,"
approved in June 1986, addresses this problem by advocating quality im-
provement and doubling the output of consumer goods.10
The quality of industrial and consumer goods is an issue not only for
the domestic economy but also for foreign trade. The Soviet Union relies
heavily on imports for high technology products which are not available
domestically.11 This concern is reflected by the long-standing Soviet
practice of placing clauses requiring "state of the art" equipment in con-
tracts with foreign suppliers. 2 On the export side, exports to the West
and to Eastern Europe are an important means by which the Soviet
Policy of the 1920s. See A. NOVE, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE U.S.S.R. 83 (1982). See also
Individual Enterprise: Opportunities and Obligations, translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS
No. 18, June 3, 1987, at 7; In Soviet, Capitalism (But Don't Call It That), N.Y. Times, May 1, 1987,
at Al, col. 1; Soviet Law Widens Private Business, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1986, at A9, col. 1.
7 Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the State Enterprise ("Law on the State
Enterprise"), translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 30, Aug. 26, 1987, at 8.
8 These changes and the reasons behind them are discussed in Architect ofSoviet Change, N.Y.
Times, July 10, 1987, at D1, col. 3; Soviet Prices: Strawberries Are A Model, N.Y. Times, June 28,
1987, § 1, at 1, col. 5; New World For Russians, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1987, at 1, col. 2; Gorbachev
Urges 'Radical' Changes To Spur Economy, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1987, at Al, col. 6. For an analy-
sis of the Soviet changes in the context of a worldwide shift to market mechanisms, see The Global
March to Free Markets, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1987, § 3 (Business), at 1, col. 2.
9 Gorbachev Opens 27th Party Congress, translated in 38 CURRENT DIG. SOy. PRESS No. 8,
Mar. 26, 1986, at 1.
10 Communique on Meetings of the USSR Supreme Soviet, translated in 38 CURRENT DIG. SOy.
PRESS No. 25, July 23, 1986, at 1. See also On the Five-Year Plan for the Economic and Social
Development of the USSR in 1986-1990 and the Tasks ofParty Organizations in Its Implementation,
translated in 38 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 24, July 16, 1987, at 2.
11 For a discussion of the Soviet Union's reliance on imports of high technology, see M.
GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 118-47.
12 The model purchase contract used by Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations requires that sellers
provide equipment which corresponds to the "highest technical level in the seller's country .. " (A
copy of the model contract is on file with the authors).
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Union obtains the currency needed to purchase foreign technology.1 3 In
an effort to obtain both modem equipment and raise the quality of its
exports and domestically made goods, the Soviet Union recently adopted
legislation permitting joint ventures with foreign businesses.14 In short,
perestroika has sharpened the need for quality goods in the Soviet
economy.
This Perspective examines the role of the Soviet legal system in im-
proving the quality of industrial and consumer products.15 After discuss-
ing the laws governing the quality of goods and the remedies for defective
products,16 the effectiveness of these laws in providing incentives for pro-
ducing quality goods will be assessed. This Perspective demonstrates
that while the socialist law of the USSR provides the tools for assuring
product quality, these laws will not be successful until the Soviet Union
deals with the more basic realities of its economic and legal systems.
II. PRODUCT LIABILITY WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION
Industrial and consumer goods in the Soviet Union are mass pro-
duced. The quality of these goods, as well as the services required to
support them, have long been criticized as inferior.17 The quality of con-
sumer goods has recently become a frequent topic of news reporting, re-
flecting the new openness (glasnost) of the Soviet press. 8 In addition to
the new Five-Year Plan and Gorbachev's speeches, the press has re-
ported a number of Party conferences and resolutions which have fo-
13 See Brainard, Foreign Economic Constraints on Soviet Economic Policy in the 1980s, in THE
SOVIET ECONOMY: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 217 (M. Bornstein ed. 1981)[hereinafter SOVIET
ECONOMY].
14 See In the USSR Council of Ministers, translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 6,
Mar. 11, 1987, at 15; In the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, translated in 38 CURRENT
DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 52, Jan. 28, 1987, at 15.
15 For earlier articles dealing with product liability law in the Soviet Union, see Zile, Consumer
Product Quality in Soviet Law: The Tried and the Changing [hereinafter Consumer Product Quality],
in SOVIET LAW AFrER STALIN: PART II SOCIAL ENGINEERING THROUGH LAW 183 (D. Barry, G.
Ginsburgs & P. Maggs eds. 1978); Darby, Products Liability in the Soviet Union, 11 INT'L LAW 179
(1977); Zile, Law and the Distribution of Consumer Goods in the Soviet Union, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 212
[hereinafter Distribution].
16 The focus of this Perspective is on efforts to improve the quality of goods manufactured in the
Soviet Union. Poor quality goods implicate contract or tort concepts if the poor quality makes them
"defective," i.e., unfit for the use normally expected by consumers. Therefore, improving the overall
quality of consumer goods is a necessary element of eliminating defective goods.
17 The poor quality of industrial and consumer goods in the Soviet Union has been a favorite
topic of Westem writers. See H. SMrrH, THE RussIANS 78 (rev. ed. 1984); D. WILLIS, KLAss: How
RUSSIANS REALLY LIVE 37 (1985); Denton, Soviet Consumer Policy: Trends and Prospects, in So-
VIET ECONOMY, supra note 13, at 176. For a discussion of the neglect of the service sector of the
Soviet economy, see S. BIALER, THE SOVIET PARADOX 70 (1986).
18 For example, the poor quality of motor vehicles was discussed in An Industry on Economic
Accountability, translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 17, May 27, 1987, at 17.
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cused on raising the quality of output. 19  Government officials and
enterprises which continue to produce inferior goods have been singled
out for criticism.2" Further, the press has reported the growth of "re-
verse-trade" enterprises which specialize in taking defective goods re-
turned by the public.2 The poor quality of consumer goods has become
an issue in the Soviet Union, however, not only because such goods harm
the economy and are a source of public dissatisfaction, but also because
defective goods may cause personal injury and property damage.22 Due
to the wide range of problems caused by poor quality products, the use of
the term product liability in this Perspective will refer to both contrac-
tual and tort liability of producers for the inferior quality of their prod-
ucts. An examination of these alternate forms of liability reveals that
"black-letter" laws can be effective in improving this quality through
producer accountability.
A. Contractual Liability
1. Liability of Trade Enterprises to Consumers
The Law on State Enterprise recognizes the state-owned enterprise
as "the socialist commodity producer" which "carries out the production
of consumer goods and provides paid services to the population."23
Since state enterprises are considered legal persons,24 the Soviet law of
obligations gives them the right to enter into contracts and creates obli-
19 See On Expanding Product Acceptance's Sphere of Activity, translated in 39 CURRENT DIG.
SOy. PRESS No. 33, Sept. 16, 1987, at 16; An Important Task of Social Policy, translated in 39
CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 21, June 24, 1987, at 10 (Party conference on increasing the produc-
tion of consumer goods); In the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, translated in 39 CUR-
RENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 19, June 10, 1987 (committee meeting to discuss production of consumer
goods); Conference in the CPSU Central Committee, translated in 38 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS
No. 32, Sept. 10, 1986, at 32 (conference on improving the quality of machinery); In the Politburo of
the CPSU Central Committee, translated in 38 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 19, June 11, 1986, at
20 (meeting of the Politburo to discuss measures for improving the quality of output); In the CPSU
Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, translated in 38 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS
No. 19, June 11, 1986, at 12 (resolution on consumer goods).
20 See In the CPSU Central Committee, translated in 38 CURRENT DIG. SOy. PRESS No. 22, July
2, 1986, at 19 (ministers responsible for radio and television production "reprimanded... for insuffi-
cient attention to the production of consumer goods and to improving their quality.").
21 Returns-Or, How Much Do 'Antigoods' Cost Us?, translated in 38 CURRENT DIG. SOV.
PRESS No. 17, May 28, 1986, at 20 [hereinafter Returns].
22 One newspaper article reported a fire in a hotel was caused by a defective color television set,
and stated that such sets had caused 5490 fires in 1985. Although the article did not cite figures, it
said that "[p]eople have died, buildings have burned." A Fire in the Picture, translated in 39 CUR-
RENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 5, Mar. 4, 1987, at 21.
23 Law on the State Enterprise, supra note 7, art. 1, § 2. For a discussion of the operation of
state enterprises, see Zile, Distribution, supra note 15, at 217-19.
24 Law on the State Enterprise, supra note 7, art. I, § 2.
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gations to consumers and other state enterprises for the goods the enter-
prises produce and sell. The Soviet law of obligations creates both a duty
to provide quality products and a remedy for purchasers of defective
goods. The provisions of the law of obligations are analogous to the laws
of contract and tort in common law. These two concepts will be used to
examine Soviet law and the role the legal system can play in improving
the quality of industrial and consumer goods.
Under Marxist theory, contracts are conceptually different under so-
cialist law from those in common law or civil law.
Under capitalism a purchase-sale contract is a means of realizing surplus
value, a form of exploitation of one class by another. In socialist society the
purchase-sale contract is a means of equivalent exchange between citizens, a
means for the expedient distribution of goods, with the aid of which the
realization of products and the labor incomes of citizens occurs simultane-
ously. Under conditions of capitalism, the purchase-sale contract reflects
"market elements." In socialist society the determinative influence on a
purchase-sale contract is exerted by the socialist planned economy. 5
The most widely used form of contract in the Soviet Union is the
"contract for sale" or "purchase-sale" contract, under which a seller
transfers property to a buyer in exchange for money.26 Under Article
245 of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Civil Code ("Civil
Code"), the quality of a product must correspond to the terms of the
contract or, in the absence of specifications in the contract, to "custom-
ary demands." Like an implied warranty in common law contract the-
ory, customary demands in socialist law require that the product
function in a normal manner for a certain period of time if it is used as
intended." In addition, the quality of articles sold by retail-trade enter-
prises must correspond to "state standards."2 A state standard is
a normative-technical document establishing a complex of norms, rules,
and requirements and approved by a competent state agency; thus it is of
both a technical and legal nature. It should reflect the most progressive
domestic and foreign experience, as well as the results of scientific research,
25 Laasik, Sovetskoe Grazhdanskoe Pravo: Chast'Osobennaia [Soviet Civil Law: Special
Part](1980), reprinted in J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER & P. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM: THE
LAW IN THE 1980s, at 289 (1984)[hereinafter THE SOVIET LEGAL SYsTEM]. A general discussion of
the socialist theory of obligations can be found in Y. FLEI5HrrS & A. MAKOVSKY, THE CIVIL
CODES OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS 91 (1976).
26 Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Civil Code ("Civil Code"), art. 237, translated in
CIVIL CODE OF THE RSFSR (W. Gray & R. Stults trans. 1965). Each of the 15 union republics of
the Soviet Union has its own civil, criminal, and procedural codes. Since there is little difference
between these codes, those of the Russian Republic's Civil Code are frequently cited as representa-
tive of Soviet law. This Perspective will follow this convention.
27 Civil Code, art. 245.
28 Id.
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experimental design and construction and inventions and discoveries. 29
Prior to the adoption of the new civil codes in 1963 and 1964, Soviet
law followed a rule of "caveat emptor." Under the old rule, the seller
was relieved of liability for defects in goods if they "were known to the
buyer during the conclusion of the contract or could have been discov-
ered by him with the necessary care and attention on his part."3 How-
ever, a seller is now liable for any defect in a product except those
revealed to the buyer prior to the sale.3
Article 246 of the Civil Code gives a buyer a choice among five rem-
edies if the consumer purchases a defective product.32 First, the buyer
can demand substitution of a proper article for one of improper quality-
quality as defined by generic characteristics in the contract.3 3 Substitu-
tion, however, is a realistic remedy only if identical goods are available.
Second, the buyer can seek a proportionate decrease in the purchase
price.34 This is appropriate if the defect does not make the goods totally
useless. Third, the seller may be required to remove the defect in the
article without charge to the buyer. Unfortunately, when the item is
returned to the seller, the Civil Code does not set a time limit within
which the repairs must be made. Fourth, the buyer may repair the item
and seek compensation for repair expenses. 36 The lack of repair facilities
and the poor quality of repairs, however, frequently frustrates this rem-
edy.3 7 Finally, the buyer may be entitled to rescission of the contract
with compensation for damages.38 Under Article 247 of the Civil Code,
the buyer must present this claim immediately after discovering it but
not later than six months after the date of delivery of the article.3 9
For products sold through retail-trade enterprises covered by "state
29 Simons, Standards, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW 720 (F. Feldbrugge, G. Van Den Berg
& W. Simons 2d rev. ed. 1985).
30 y. FLEISHIS & A. MAKOVSKY, supra note 25, at 139.






37 See H. SMITH, supra note 17, at 73-74 (discussion of the shortage of repair facilities and spare
parts for automobiles).
38 Returning the item to the factory involves extensive and detailed paperwork. In the case of
defective shoes, for example, the purchaser must write a declaration of rejection in quadruplicate.
The receiving clerk at the factory is required to fill out five copies of a certificate of rejection, the
expert's determination (in triplicate), six copies of the invoice, a notice to the public representative
informing him or her of the right to participate in the rejection proceedings (in triplicate), the bill for
the expert's determination (in triplicate), the receipt for the certification of rejection (in triplicate),
and the postal receipts (in triplicate). Returns, supra note 21, at 21.
39 Civil Code, art. 247.
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standards," the buyer has a choice of three remedies. The consumer may
demand that the seller repair the defect in the product without charge,
substitute one of the proper quality, or take back the product and return
the purchase price." The period for filing a claim is determined by the
length of time set out in the state standard and is calculated from the
date of the retail sale.41 However, the buyer must present a claim to the
seller (i.e., the trading enterprise) and not to the producer, unless an ac-
tion against the producer is specifically provided by the law. The Civil
Chamber of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme
Court has held that "the producer does not bear a direct liability towards
the buyer of the losses caused to him, as he is not a party to the
contract."'42
As with common law contract remedies, the detailed contract provi-
sions of the Soviet law of obligations are intended to give the buyer what
he or she expected to receive. The realities of the Soviet economy, how-
ever, have created a situation where a legal right exists without an effec-
tive remedy. Thus, there has been little incentive for purchasers of
defective products to resort to the legal system since the code provisions
have been mere formalities rather than enforceable obligations.
2. Liability Between State Enterprises
An important factor contributing to defective consumer goods in the
Soviet Union is the inferior quality of goods shipped by supplier enter-
prises to manufacturing enterprises,43 chiefly due to the fact that rela-
tionships among Soviet factories have been governed by centrally
planned contracts.' The duties and obligations under these contracts do
not arise from the parties' negotiations. Instead, central planning agen-
cies set production and delivery quotas and pricing policies. Factories
often have no choice but to accept the defective supplies and then pass on
the defective product to the consumer.
The supply of goods between state enterprises is governed by a "de-
livery contract," which is different from the "contract for sale" between
trade enterprises and individuals. Under a delivery contract, a supplier
40 Civil Code, art. 248.
41 Id.
42 Ruling of the Civil Chamber of the RSFSR Supreme Court, 3 BULL. VERKH. SUDA RSFSR 9
(1982), quoted in Van den Berg, Product Liability, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW, supra note
29, at 627.
43 This is due in part to a chronic shortage of supplies and a hierarchy of allocation of those
supplies. See M. BINYON, supra note 5, at 15-16; H. SMrrH, supra note 17, at 301-05.
44 For a discussion of the role of contracts in the Soviet system of central planning, see Dore,
Plan and Contract in the Domestic and Foreign Trade of the USSR, 8 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. &
COMM. 29, 31-75 (1980); Loeber, Plan and Contract Performance in Soviet Law, 1964 ILL. L.F. 128.
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enterprise undertakes to transfer specified goods at a specified time (or
times) to the buyer enterprise.45 The quality of the goods supplied under
a delivery contract must correspond to "state standards, technical specifi-
cations or samples.",4 6 A contract may provide for delivery of goods of
higher quality than that required by state standards, technical specifica-
tions, or samples.47
If the supplier enterprise delivers goods of a lower quality than that
required by state standards, technical specifications, or samples, the
buyer is required to refuse to accept or to refuse to pay for the goods.4
If the buyer has already paid for the goods, the purchase price may be
recovered. If the defect in the goods can be removed without returning
them to the supplier, however, the buyer has a right to demand that the
supplier correct the defect at the supplier's expense. In each of these
cases, an action arising out of the delivery of defective goods is subject to
a six month statute of limitations running from the date the buyer estab-
lished the existence of the defect in the delivered goods.49
The Soviet government decided early that disputes between state en-
terprises over delivery contracts should not be heard by the regular
courts, but by special tribunals. Two bodies were established to resolve
economic disputes: State Arbitrazh and Departmental Arbitrazh. State
Arbitrazh (gosarbitrazg) deal with economic disputes between enterprises
belonging to different regional economic councils or different minis-
tries.5 ) Departmental Arbitrazh (vedomstvenny) handle conflicts within
a single regional economic council or ministry.51 Although State and
Departmental Arbitrazh are administrative agencies, they function like
courts since their jurisdiction is compulsory and they decide disputes ac-
cording to the law.52
If an Arbitrazh finds that goods delivered under a contract do not
meet the required standards of quality, Article 266 of the Civil Code
provides that the buying enterprise can recover the "established penalty"
45 Civil Code, art. 258.
46 Id. art. 261.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. art. 262.
50 See generally Dore, supra note 44, at 35-37; Loeber, supra note 44, at 131-33; Pomorski, State
Arbitrazh in the USSR, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 61 (1977).
51 See Loeber, supra note 44, at 132.
52 Article 4 of the controlling statute provides that an Arbitrazh "shall be guided in its activity
by laws of the USSR, edicts of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, decrees and regulations
of the USSR government, other normative acts, and the present statute." Statute on State Arbitrazh
Attached to the USSR Council of Ministers, Confirmed by Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers,
Jan. 18, 1974, translated in W. BUTLER, THE SOCIALIsT LEGAL SYSTEM-LEGISLATION AND Doc-
UMENTATION 253 (1978).
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as well as any damages caused by the delivery of the defective goods.
The "established penalty" is assessed as a percentage of the value of the
shipment of defective goods. Arbitrazh also hear tort claims of one state
enterprise against another, such as a defective machine supplied by one
enterprise which causes property damage to another enterprise.5 3 In ad-
dition, if it is found that the defective goods were part of a systematic
pattern of supplying such goods, Arbitrazh may refer the matter to the
Procurator General for possible criminal sanctions. 4
According to one study, disputes over the poor quality of goods sup-
plied under delivery contracts account for 20% of all the property dis-
putes handled by Arbitrazh.5 The handling of these disputes has
recently been criticized by the Communist Party Central Committee and
the Council of Ministers, which have accused the Arbitrazh of failing "to
display proper initiative and persistence" and for exerting little influence
on enterprises to improve the quality of output. 6 In 1987 the operation
of the State Arbitrazh was restructured, and its powers were expanded.5 7
In order to increase the influence of the Arbitrazh "on the strengthening
of legality and on plan and contractual discipline in the economy," it was
given the power to monitor the compliance of enterprises with legislative
requirements for contracts and to issue orders to persons responsible for
losses incurred in connection with the violation of contracts.5
8
As with contracts between trade enterprises and individuals, the law
of obligations provides detailed remedies for enterprises which receive
defective supplies from other enterprises. Despite the strengthening of
the Arbitrazh, however, these provisions will not be effective until enter-
prises fully exercise their rights against other enterprises, and delivery
contracts are viewed not merely as formalities but as legally enforceable
obligations.
B. Tort Liability
In the Soviet Union, tort liability for defective products is not a sep-
arate area of law as it is in the United States.5 9 Remedies for Soviet
53 See H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE USSR 130 (rev. ed. 1963).
54 See Darby, supra note 15, at 188.
55 See Loeber, supra note 44, at 92 n.182.
56 On Further Improving the Performance of State Arbitration Agencies and Enhancing Their
Role in Strengthening Legality and Contractual Discipline in the Economy, translated in 39 CURRENT
DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 9, Apr. 1, 1987, at 21.
57 Id. at 22.
58 Id.
59 The most important development in product liability law in the United States during the past
twenty years has been the shift from warranty and negligence theories of liability to a theory of strict
liability. California was the first state to adopt strict liability in products liability cases. Greenman
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consumers who suffer injury or loss from defective products are provided
in the law of obligations sections dealing with "Obligations Which Arise
from the Causing of Injury."' 6' Despite the availability of social insur-
ance, tort law in the Soviet Union has maintained its viability.61 Social
insurance covers medical expenses and "temporary disability" at a mini-
mum level of lost earnings.62 Victims whose losses exceed the amount of
the insurance must bring suits to recover the difference between the in-
surance and their actual losses. These adversarial proceedings play an
important role in furthering the three purposes of tort law in the Soviet
Union: 1) compensating the tort victim for the material loss he or she
suffers; 2) reforming the individual tortfeasor; and 3) educating the pub-
lic at large to refrain from unlawful acts that might result in material
damage to others.63
The basis of tort law in the Soviet Union is Article 444 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Injury caused to the person or property of a citizen, as well as injury
caused to an organization, is subject to compensation in full by the person
who has caused such injury.
A person who has caused harm is relieved of the duty to make com-
pensation if he proves that the injury was not caused through his fault.64
There are a number of aspects of Article 444 and Soviet tort law which
could make it applicable to cases involving defective products. First, Ar-
ticle 444 states that any "citizen" or "organization" which suffers per-
v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). In 1965 the Ameri-
can Law Institute published § 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, which has been
widely cited by courts as a description of when strict liability should be applied. See Suvada v.
White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
One theory of strict liability is that the manufacturer is in a better position, through pricing or
insurance, to bear the inevitable losses caused by mass produced goods. This has been part of the
broader trend in Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States toward
insurance as a means of compensating injuries. For a discussion of the shift of liability from tort to
insurance in common law and civil law countries, see W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCI-
ETY 161 (2d ed. 1972).
60 Civil Code, ch. 40. There are a number of works analyzing tort law in the Soviet Union. See
Osakwe, An Examination of the Modern Soviet Law of Torts, 54 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1979); Y.
FLEISHIIS & A. MAKOVSKY, supra note 25, at 205-20; Darby, The Influence of Marxian Socialism
on the Soviet Law of Torts, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 373 (1985); Rudden, Soviet Tort Law, 42
N.Y.U.L. REv. 583 (1967); Gray, Soviet Tort Law: The New Principles Annotated, 1964 U. ILL. L.F.
180; Holman & Spinner, Bases of Liability for Tortious Injury in Soviet Law, 22 IOWA L. REv. 1
(1936).
61 For a discussion of the development and role of insurance in the Soviet Union, see Tay, The
Foundations of Tort Liability in a Socialist Legal System, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1969); Hazard,
Personal Injury and Soviet Socialism, 65 HARV. L. REv. 545 (1952); Osakwe, supra note 60, at 4;
Gray, supra note 60, at 181-83.
62 See Rudden, supra note 60, at 612-14.
63 See Osakwe, supra note 60, at 5.
64 For a discussion of Article 444, see Osakwe, supra note 60, at 9-17.
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sonal or property damage may recover compensation. Unlike contract
law, an action in tort for injury or loss caused by a defective product
would not be limited to the purchaser but includes users and bystanders.
"The person who has caused the harm" is also broad enough to include
both the manufacturer and the seller of the product.
Second, under Article 444 the three essential elements of liability
are: 1) an "unlawful act' 6' by the defendant; 2) the fault of the defendant
in committing the act;66 and 3) a causal connection between the unlawful
act and plaintiff's injury.67 The problems of proof that confront plaintiffs
in product liability cases brought under negligence or strict liability theo-
ries in the United States are not present in Soviet law. Soviet law creates
a rebuttable presumption of the unlawfulness of defendant's act and his
fault. 68
Third, Article 458 of the Civil Code adopts the doctrine of compara-
tive fault rather than contributory negligence 9.6  Thus, if Article 444 was
applied in cases of defective products, ordinary negligence in the use of
the product would not bar a consumer from recovery. If the consumer
was grossly negligent or intentionally misused the product, however, the
defendant would not be liable for the resulting injury. In cases where
Article 458 has been applied, Soviet courts have not been willing to make
detailed comparisons of fault. Instead, they have simply reduced the
plaintiff's recovery by 50%.70
Fourth, damages are limited to plaintiff's actual material loss in the
Soviet Union.7' Compensation for nonpecuniary harms such as "pain
and suffering" and punitive damages is not available to individuals.72
This eliminates from Soviet tort law a major source of controversy over
product liability law in the United States and could make it easier to use
Article 444 to establish liability for defective products. In addition,
although property loss and medical expenses are paid in a lump sum,
65 "Unlawful act" has been defined as "any action not permitted by law (commission), or any
failure to act where the law requires an action (omission)." Osakwe, supra note 60, at 12; see also
Rudden, supra note 60, at 602-04.
66 Soviet commentators have defined "fault" as "an internal state of mind which manifests itself
externally in the form of an unlawful conduct .... Such conduct could be intentional ... and it
could be negligent." SOVETSKOE GRAZHDANSKE PRAVO [SOVIET CIVIL LAW] 501 (D. Genkin & I.
Kunik eds. 1967), quoted in Osakwe, supra note 60, at 14. See also Rudden, supra note 60, at 597-
602.
67 For a discussion of the required causal connection, see Osakwe, supra note 60, at 15-17; Rud-
den, supra note 60, at 586-97.
68 See Osakwe, supra note 60, at 15; Y. FLEISHITS & A. MAKOVSKY, supra note 25, at 207-09.
69 See Osakwe, supra note 60, at 33-34.
70 Id. at 26.
71 Id. at 23-32. See also Rudden, supra note 60, at 609-12.
72 See Osakwe, supra note 60, at 29.
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compensation for personal injury is paid through a system of periodic
payments under Article 468 of the Civil Code.73
Finally, an important consideration in the application of Article 444
to product liability cases is that almost all production and retail trade
enterprises in the Soviet Union are owned by the state. In order to
achieve the goals of tort law, these enterprises are considered legal per-
sons.74 Although they are not called "corporations," state-owned enter-
prises have been compared to government corporations which carry on
economic activities with relative financial autonomy." Article 445 of the
Civil Code limits traditional governmental immunity and provides that
"[a]n organization is required to compensate for injury caused through
the fault of its workers in the performance of their employment (official)
duties.",7 6 Thus, state organizations are liable for injuries caused in con-
nection with activities of an economic nature.7 7
The exception to the fault principle in Soviet tort law is Article 454.
Article 454 imposes liability for injuries caused by activities that create a
"heightened hazard," even though these injures were caused without
fault:
Organizations and citizens whose activities are connected with increased
hazard to persons in their vicinity (transport organization, industrial enter-
prises, construction projects, possessors of automobiles, etc.) are required to
compensate for injury caused by extra-hazardous source, unless they prove
that the injury arose through intent on the part of the victim or through
irresistible force.78
Although the language of Article 454 is similar to the strict liability
created by the "abnormally dangerous" and "ultrahazardous activities"
tests of the Restatement of Torts,7 9 it has a different application:
By sources of heightened hazard are understood the properties of the things
and forces of nature utilized in certain types of activity and which are not
fully under human control at the present level of technique .... Therefore,
in order to render such harm preventable and to enable Soviet citizens and
73 Id.
74 Law on the State Enterprise, supra note 7, art. 1, § 2. State economic enterprises have been
treated as juridical persons since the 1930s. See H. BERMAN, supra note 53, at I11.
75 H. BERMAN, supra note 53, at I 11.
76 Civil Code, art. 445.
77 For a history and detailed discussion of governmental immunity in Russia and the Soviet
Union, see Barry, Governmental Tort Liability in the Soviet Union, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 300 (1966);
Gray, supra note 60, at 193-96; Osakwe, supra note 60, at 51-52.
78 Civil Code, art. 454. For a discussion of Article 454, see Tay, Principles of Liability and the
Source of 'Increased Danger' in the Soviet Law of Torts, 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 424 (1969); Y.
FLEISHITS & A. MAKOVSKY, supra note 25, at 209-12; Gray, supra note 60, at 196-99; Osakwe,
supra note 60, at 17-23.
79 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, §§ 519, 520 (1979)(definitions of "ultrahazardous
activities" and "abnormally dangerous").
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organizations to struggle as intensively as possible to prevent hazards aris-
ing from their work or activities, the law has established heightened respon-
sibility to the owner of a source of heightened hazard. 80
A study conducted by the Soviets limited the sources of heightened
hazards to four categories: physical sources (such as automobiles, trains,
ships, machines for the production of goods, electrical and thermal
sources), physical-chemical sources, chemical sources, and biological
sources." In addition, Article 454 has been applied only against those in
possession of the hazard, not the creator of the hazard. Thus, under So-
viet law, drivers of automobiles, and not their manufacturers, are strictly
liable for the injuries caused.82
Unlike the contract provisions of the Soviet law of obligations, the
tort provisions contain no explicit reference to remedies for defective
products. Despite the fact that Article 444 could be used by persons who
suffer personal injury or property damage from defective products, it has
not been used in that way. This can be attributed in part to the nature of
the Soviet legal system.83 Any social or legal reform must be assessed in
light of the realities of this system.
III. LEGAL REFORM AND SOVIET PRODUCT LIABILITY
A system of product liability law should serve two purposes. Its
immediate goal should be to provide a remedy for one who has suffered
personal injury or property damage as the result of a defective product.
By doing so, it should also serve a long-range purpose of providing an
incentive to manufacturers and retailers to raise the quality of the prod-
ucts they produce and sell in order to maximize their profits and mini-
mize their losses. Although the Soviet law of obligations contains
remedies for individuals and enterprises who purchase defective goods,
they have not accomplished either of the goals of a law of product liabil-
ity. The reason for this has been the historically significant gap between
the formal provisions of Soviet law and their operation in practice. The
Law on the State Enterprise has attempted to address some of these diffi-
culties. Whether its provisions can be used to create an effective law of
product liability will depend upon several factors, however. The struc-
ture of the economic system, workers' incentive to produce quality prod-
ucts, the cooperation of the bureaucracy, and the nature of the Soviet
80 y. FLaISHrrs & A. MAKOVSKY, supra note 25, at 209-10.
81 See Osakwe, supra note 60, at 21.
82 For a discussion of the increasing number of automobile accidents in the Soviet Union, see
Who WillLove the Car Lover?, translated in 38 CURRENT DIG. SOv. PRESs No. 47, Dec. 24, 1986, at
18.
83 See infra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
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legal system itself, must all be addressed for the legal reforms to achieve
their goals.
A. The Structure of the Soviet Economy
The central feature of the Soviet economy for the past seventy years
has been central planning.14 This has resulted in the development of a
highly structured pyramid system in the Soviet economy. At the top of
the pyramid are the State Planning Commission ("GOSPLAN"), which
drafts production plans, and the State Committee of Supply ("GOSS-
NAB"), which drafts distribution plans. On the production side, GOS-
PLAN prepares plans sent to each government ministry, which then
divide their targets into specific production goals for each enterprise
under their jurisdictions. On the distribution side, GOSSNAB deter-
mines distribution plans for ministries in charge of the particular goods
distribution. These ministries then issue delivery orders to supplier and
buyer enterprises which are implemented by delivery contracts between
the enterprises. Since the most important conditions of delivery con-
tracts are determined by the ministry, few details are negotiated by the
enterprises themselves.
This system of central planning has had important consequences for
the quality of goods produced under the plan and contract. First, the
planning process has historically given high priority to allocating re-
sources and quality control to the military and heavy industry. 5 Despite
the provisions of the law of obligations, little emphasis has been placed
on the quality of consumer goods.8 6 There are a number of reasons for
this lack of emphasis. Until the 1960s, the Soviet Union's primary tasks
were modernization and the repair of the destruction caused by World
84 For an examination of the Soviet economy from a legal perspective, see 0. IOFFE & P.
MAGGS, THE SOVIET ECONOMIC SYSTEM: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1987). The role of central planning
in the Soviet Economy is discussed in A. NOVE, supra note 6; F. HOLZMAN, THE SOVIET ECONOMY
(1982); Ioffe, Law and Economy in the USSR, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1591 (1982); SOVIET ECONOMY,
supra note 13, at 7-93; Dore, supra note 44; V. CHKHIKVADZE, THE SOVIET STATE AND LAW 188-
200 (1969); Loeber, supra note 44, at 141-48; THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 25, pt. II.
85 This emphasis had its origins with Stalin, who concluded that the chief priority of the econ-
omy was the expansion of heavy industry. This policy produced impressive results until the 1960s,
when industrial production began to drop. See M. GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 14-41; A. NOVE,
supra note 6, at 76.
86 According to the observations of one Soviet:
Workers in the very same factories produce good refrigerators for the military and refrigerators
that are largely junk for the civilian market, but nobody cares because there is no real quality
control. I have seen how they made transistors. They would make 100 and the military repre-
sentative would select only one or two. Some would be thrown out as defective and the rest
would go to the [civilian] market.
H. SMITH, supra note 17, at 314.
Soviet Union Product Liability
8:640(1988)
War 11.17 This emphasis left few resources available to the consumer
sector. With the improved living standards of the 1960s came a debate
(carried over to the 1970s) over whether the satisfaction of people's mate-
rial needs was intrinsically "counter-revolutionary." 88 Although this de-
bate has now been resolved in favor of the compatibility of consumer
expectations with socialism, it has had a continued effect on those bu-
reaucrats who must make ideologically correct planning decisions.
The second factor relating to quality of goods is the Soviet central
planning process, with its artificial prices and lack of competition be-
tween enterprises. This process has created a system where gross output
is the measure of success. Since goods are produced to fulfill the require-
ments of the central plan and not to satisfy the public needs there are no
incentives for producer enterprises to make quality an essential element
of their products. The year-end bonuses awarded to managers and work-
ers are based upon their success in fulfilling the quantity targets of the
plan.8 9 Whether or not those products are defective has not been a factor
in determining bonuses.
Third, the planning process has resulted in a "storming" style of
production. 0 Under this system, the tempo of work is different for each
ten days of the month. Little work is done during the first ten days of the
month. The pace increases during the second ten days, and during the
final third of the month "storming" occurs: workers put in double shifts
and work weekends in an effort to meet their production quotas. An
inevitable result of such a system is that the quality of the goods pro-
duced by the workers is uneven. 91
The Law on the State Enterprise redefines the economic and legal
basis of state enterprises in the Soviet economy and gives them new pow-
ers and incentives to emphasize quality. According to the law, the "chief
task" of the state enterprise is
87 A. NOVE, supra note 6, at 289-370.
88 See, e.g., Zile, Consumer Product Quality, supra note 15, at 185-86.
89 Under the Stalinist model, the main criteria for success has been quantity. "The more a
worker or a manager produced, the better .... Those who were able to increase production won
appropriate recognition, material and nonmaterial, from their superiors." M. GOLDMAN, supra note
1, at 20-21. See also Kroll, Breach of Contract in the Soviet Economy, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 122-
23 (1987).
90 This system of production is discussed at length in M. BINYON, supra note 5, at 14-33; H.
SMITH, supra note 17, at 285-89.
91 As one commentator noted:
[WMhen someone buys a household appliance, he tries to buy one with a certificate saying that it
was produced before the 15th of the month and not after the 15th .... If the item was made
before the 15th, obviously it was not made in a rush and the customer thinks, 'maybe it will
work.' If it was made after the 15th, there's a good chance it will stop working pretty quickly.
H. SMITH, supra note 17, at 287-88.
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satisfying in every way the social requirements of the national economy and
of citizens for its output (work, services), which should have high consumer
properties and be of high quality, and doing so with the smallest possible
outlays, as well as increasing its contribution to the acceleration of the
country's social and economic development .... 92
In order to accomplish these goals, state enterprises are given greater
authority to make business decisions under the new law.93 Ministries
and central planning agencies will focus on long-range planning and will
no longer be involved in the day-to-day supervision of enterprises.
9 4
Along with this greater independence, enterprises will be expected to op-
erate "on the principles [of] full economic accountability and self-financ-
ing"9 and to compete among themselves in a "highly important form of
socialist competition." 96
Enterprises are also given the right to set prices for their goods.
Prices are expected to "reflect socially necessary outlays on the produc-
tion and sale of output, its consumer properties, quality and effective de-
mand." 97 By ensuring the "production and sale of the best output (work,
services) with the smallest possible costs," the enterprise "obtains a large
economic-accountability income and an advantage in its production and
social development and in pay for its employees."9' These profits may be
used to pay workers "according to their labor contribution," with no
limits placed on workers' earnings. 99 The enterprises are also given the
power to transfer unneeded or unproductive workers."° Enterprises
which cannot compete and which "operate ... at a loss for a long time"
will be declared insolvent and terminated.101
Although it is too early to know what effect the Law on the State
Enterprise will have on the Soviet economy and quality of products,
92 Law on the State Enterprise, supra note 7, art. 1, § 3.
93 According to Article 1, § 2, of the Law on the State Enterprise, the enterprise "sells output,
performs work and provides services in accordance with the plan and contracts and on the basis of
... self-management and the combination of centralized management and the independence of the
enterprise." An enterprise "has the right, at its own initiative, to make all decisions if they are'not at
variance with existing legislation." Id. art. 2, § 5.
94 The principal function of the ministries and planning agencies is the development of "the state
plan of economic and social development." The enterprise then "independently works out and con-
firms its own plans and concludes contracts" based upon the plan and consumers' orders. Id. art. 2,
§ 1.
95 Id. art. 2, § 2.
96 Id. art. 2, § 4.
97 Id. art. 17, § 6.
98 Id. art. 2, § 4.
99 Id. art. 3, § 2; art. 14, § 1.
100 Id. art. 8, §§ 2, 4.
101 Id. art. 23, § 1. Soviet economist Abel Aganbegyan has argued that "unprofitable enterprises
... must be liquidated in the interests of society." See There's Nowhere to Retreat To, translated in
39 CURRENT DIG. SOy. PREss No. 35, Sept. 30, 1987, at 12, 13.
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some predictions can be made from the experience of Byelorussian light
industry and retail stores, which have been operating under the system
envisioned by the Law of State Enterprises since the beginning of
1987.1 In at least one retail store, the incentive of bonuses and commis-
sions has shifted both managers' and workers' emphases to satisfying
consumer desires and raising quality by refusing to pay suppliers for de-
fective goods. Although there is still a shortage of some goods, the store
has begun to negotiate contracts directly with manufacturers and hopes
to sell coveted items at a higher price. 103
It is unclear what effect the law will have on the "storming" style of
production. If the rigid quotas set by the central planning agencies are
abandoned, and more independence and flexibility is given to industry to
deal directly with retail stores through delivery contracts, a more orderly
production process may develop. However, the government must also
allocate sufficient resources and quality control to the consumer sector.
Reforming those aspects of the economic system that have resulted in
defective consumer goods will also require the support of the workers
and the cooperation of the bureaucracy.
B. Worker Attitudes
In order for the Soviet campaign for economic reform to succeed, it
must have the support of the workers. They must see that it is in their
interests not only to increase productivity but also to raise the quality of
the goods they produce. While there is support for the government's new
policies among the workers, there is also skepticism about whether the
policies will ultimately succeed. The need for change in worker attitudes
will require the Soviet government to divert resources it now spends on
the military. For example, the government will need to improve its out-
moded economic infrastructure and create more efficient machinery for
light industry and consumer goods. 104
The Soviet government recognizes the role that incentives can play
in motivating workers to increase the quantity and quality of produc-
tion. 05 However, previous attempts to use material incentives were not
successful in raising worker motivation because of the lack of high-qual-
ity consumer goods on which the extra income could be spent.10 6 In
102 See One Russian Store Offers Silks Instead of Sneers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1987, § 1, at 18,
col. 3 [hereinafter One Russian Store].
103 Id.
104 M. GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 11-12.
105 For a discussion of the Soviet view of the effect of worker motivation on the quality of produc-
tion, see A Social Resource, translated in 38 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 2, Feb. 12, 1986, at 1.
106 According to a study by the Soviet Official Institute for the Study of Consumer Demand and
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addition, the Soviet economic system provides a number of trade-offs for
its workers. On the one hand, workers face a shortage of consumer
goods of inferior quality, low pay, and routine work. On the other hand,
rent is low, medical treatment is free, and education is subsidized.1" 7
Further, while workers may be criticized for the defective goods they
produce, they are rarely dismissed. Thus, it is not surprising that worker
morale has suffered with the introduction of quality control inspectors
into factories and the failure to count defective goods in determining plan
fulfillment and bonuses. 108
The Soviet government is trying to convince workers to give up the
system that has shaped their lives for seventy years and embrace the
changes and the uncertainty inherent in the Law on the State Enterprise
and the Law on Individual Enterprise. The government has proposed
three approaches: 1) improve the skill of workers through advanced
training and retraining in new technologies; 2) create conditions that will
permit workers to make full use of their creative potential; and 3) provide
workers with incentives for active participation in the production pro-
cess.t 09 There are some indications that these approaches will work. For
example, the success of a cooperative brigade of workers organized to
repair televisions and radios indicates that these factors may play an im-
portant role in improving efficiency and quality." 0
Retail Trade, the demand for goods exceeds their supply by more than $30 billion a year. See One
Russian Store, supra note 102; S. BIALER, supra note 17, at 57-80.
107 Most workers feel that these benefits, particularly job security, outweigh the disadvantages of
the marketplace. See H. SMITH, supra note 17, at 90-91.
108 See Goldman, An Experiment in Chaos?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1987, § 3, at F3, col. 1.
109 The Main Social Force for Acceleration, translated in 38 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 43,
Nov. 26, 1986, at 7. In the first month after the Law on Individual Enterprise went into effect,
approximately 10,000 Moscow residents indicated a desire to obtain a permit or get a license. How-
ever, one Soviet official stated that the government had expected that there would be three or four
times as many applicants. See Work for Enterprising People, translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. SOV.
PRESS No. 23, July 8, 1987, at 19. Applicants who intended to work exclusively in individual enter-
prises, without also being employed in a state enterprise or institution, were denied a permit. Id. at
20.
Most of the applications were for personal services, such as sewing clothes, providing photogra-
phy services, and driving taxis. "Very few" were from persons wishing to build or repair consumer
goods. Id. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the uncertainty of what is permitted under
the law has resulted in local bureaucratic opposition. This has led the government to emphasize that
"individual labor, if it falls within the bounds of the law, is socially useful activity that all of us
need." Individual Labor, translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. SOy. PRESS No. 36, Oct. 7, 1987, at 1.
Second, many persons have expressed reluctance to seek permits because they fear that the new
economic policies will not last. Id. at 2. Finally, some persons who are engaged in illegal occupa-
tions fear they will no longer be able to get the materials they need to continue working if they get a
license. Id.
110 In 1985 the Elektron Radio and TV Repair Association in Tallin, Estonia, was given author-
ity to rent out a workshop to a cooperative brigade of workers. The brigade paid a set fee per worker
and 30% of what it earned to the government. Anything above that amount was distributed to the
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A survey of workers in Moscow and the Central Asian republic of
Kazakhstan, however, reveals that the reforms support the policy
changes but are uncertain and even distrustful about what they will mean
to their lives. 11 For example, 62% of the workers at a Moscow plumb-
ing factory felt that the new policies would simply mean more work for
them." 2 One-third of these workers said they were waiting to see how
the policies turned out.' 13 Many workers complained that they had not
even seen any of the changes. 1 4 This attitude demonstrates some of the
difficulties the government faces. Until the workers see real changes in
the economic system, they will be reluctant to work harder to improve
the quality of the goods they produce. However, even if the changes
envisioned by the Law on the State Enterprise are successful, it may be
years before their full effect is felt in all enterprises.-
C. Bureaucratic Resistance
In addition to convincing workers that an increase in productivity
and the quality of the goods is in their self-interest, the Soviet govern-
ment must also deal with bureaucratic resistance stemming from the con-
fusion, skepticism, resistance-and in some cases opposition-of Party
members, bureaucrats, and factory managers. 115 While some Party
members oppose the changes for ideological reasons," 6 the resistance of
many factory managers and bureaucrats is motivated by economic self-
interest. Under the Law on State Enterprise, a factory which produces
defective products and is unable to be financially independent will be
closed and its workers transferred to other jobs."I7 If such a closure oc-
curs, the managers will also lose their positions and the bureaucracy will
lose part of the reason for its existence."" In other cases, opposition to
workers. The financial rewards, coupled with the ability of the workers to control their work and
take an active part in the management of the cooperative, led to an improvement in the quality of the
repair work. According to an article in Izvestia, the wait for repairs decreased from two weeks to
one day.
Similar experiments have been tried, with success, in other parts of the Soviet Union. See M.
GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 75. For a discussion of the success of "cooperative cafes" in raising the
quality of restaurant food and service, see Co-op Cafe, More from Lenin than Escoffier, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 26, 1987, at A4, col. 3.
111 Restructuring and the Economic Mechanism: The Reality of Hopes, translated in 39 CURRENT
DIG. SoV. PREss No. 18, June 3, 1987, at 5.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 5-6.
115 For a discussion of the attitude of the bureaucracy to the new economic policies, see S. Bi-
ALER, supra note 17, at 130-36; Draper, supra note 1, at 297-300.
116 See supra note 115.
117 Law on the State Enterprise, supra note 7, art. 23.
118 This was the explanation offered for the continued operation of a refrigerator factory, despite
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the new policies is the result of the traditional reluctance of factory offi-
cials and bureaucrats to experiment with new techniques. 119 The success
of the new economic reforms and laws and an improvement in the qual-
ity of consumer goods, therefore, will require not only a change in fac-
tory and government personnel, but a change in the attitude, education,
motivation, and ambition of these officials.
The attitude toward the government's new policies is illustrated by
the bureaucracy's approach to the new state quality control agencies
which have been established to monitor the quality of industrial out-
put.12° A newspaper investigation revealed that "acceptance at the local
level has been accompanied by paper shuffling and is being hindered by
bureaucratic fetters." 121 The press attributed this to "stereotyped think-
ing, the custom of surrounding any and all endeavors with necessary and
unnecessary paperwork, the habit of 'playing it safe,' and the lack of
proper initiative, independence and competency."' 22 The agency em-
ployees complained that a large part of their time was spent in submitting
memos and reports to organizations that had no direct effect on their
work.123 The press criticized the bureaucratic limitations on the agen-
cies' work. These limitations are certainly an obstacle that may prevent
the government from restructuring the economy and raising the quality
of industrial and consumer products. 124
D. Characteristics of the Soviet Legal System
In considering what role the law of obligations can play in providing
remedies for defective products and improving the quality of products,
the characteristics of the Soviet legal system and the role played by the
individual and enterprises in socialist legal thought are crucial.125 The
widespread recognition of the poor quality of its product. See M. GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 254-
55.
119 For a discussion of bureaucratic resistance to change, see M. GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 104-
05, 254-55; H. SMITH, supra note 17, at 300-11.
120 Once More on the "State Product Acceptance Exam," translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. Sov.




124 The Soviets have expressed concern over whether vested interests can prevent economic re-
structuring. See Restructuring in the Economy, translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 3,
Feb. 18, 1987, at 1.
125 There are numerous works describing the Soviet legal system. The most recent are W. BUT-
LER, SOVIET LAW (1983); Marxism and the Law, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 217-496 (1985);
Osakwe, The Four Images of Soviet Law: A Philosophical Analysis of the Soviet Legal System, 21 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 1 (1985); Minan & Morris, Unraveling an Enigma: An Introduction to Soviet Law and the
Soviet Legal System, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 4 n.33 (1985)(a detailed list of books
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problems faced by the Soviet legal system and its use of codes and judi-
cial decisions do not differ significantly from those legal systems that
constitute the "civil law tradition." '126 However, the role of the Commu-
nist Party and Marxist ideology have led some to classify the Soviet
Union as part of a separate "socialist legal system." 127
One basis for distinguishing the common law tradition and the civil
law tradition from the socialist legal tradition is the different role the
individual plays in socialist legal systems. The common law and civil law
have been strongly influenced by the French Revolution and its emphasis
on the individual's deciding his or her own best interest.128 The role of
government in this tradition is to minimize the inevitable friction be-
tween competing individual interests. An example of this is seen in the
shift from warranty and negligence theories of liability to a theory of
strict liability in product liability cases in the United States. This change
did not result from a government policy, but from a series of suits
brought by individuals against manufacturers, wholesalers, and
retailers. 129
Socialist legal theory rejects the Western concept of individualism
and views the individual as a product of society. 3 ' It is society that
should determine what is in the interests of its members. This is ex-
pressed in the 1977 USSR Constitution, Article 6:
The leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its polit-
ical system, of all state organizations and public organizations is the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union. ... The Communist Party, armed with
Marxism-Leninism, determines the general perspectives of the development
of society and the course of the home and foreign policy of the USSR, di-
rects the great constructive work of the Soviet people, and imparts a
planned, systematic and theoretically substantiated character to their strug-
gle for the victory of communism. 131
In the Soviet Union, changes in the application of legal principles do not
come from the initiative of private individuals but are regulated and con-
trolled by the government. In addition, the role of the courts in socialist
and articles published during the past seven years dealing with Soviet law and the Soviet legal
system).
126 A "legal system" has been defined as:
[A] set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes... about the nature of law, about the
role of law in the society and the polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal
system, and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected and taught.
J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 2 (2d ed. 1985).
127 Id. at 4. See also M. GLENDON, M. GORDON & C. OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADI-
TIONS 672-964 (1985)(detailed discussion of "the socialist legal tradition").
128 H. BERMAN, supra note 53, at 97.
129 For a discussion of this development, see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
130 See H. BERMAN, supra note 53, at 97-100.
131 Translated in S. FINER, FIVE CONSTITrnTIONS 149-50 (1979).
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legal theory and the civil law tradition is very different from that in com-
mon law systems. 132 Their function is to apply the articles of the code to
the particular case before the court. Precedent plays no formal role in
socialist and civil law theory. Consequently, the courts' interpretation of
code sections cannot be used to fashion new legal theories or remedies
which will then be applied in future cases. In socialist law and civil law
systems, it is the function of the legislature to make new laws in response
to the changing conditions of society. In the Soviet Union, this function
is the sole responsibility of the Supreme Soviet, in response to the objec-
tives and priorities set out by the Communist Party.
133
Despite the language in the law of obligations, the nature of the So-
viet legal system gives individuals who purchase defective products or
who are injured by such products remedies. The contract provisions of
the law of obligations require that products meet "customary demands"
or state "standards." Yet remedies under these provisions are limited,
and the process for obtaining these limited remedies is cumbersome.
Consequently, individual recovery, although allowed, is discouraged by
the Soviet legal system. This is consistent with the minimal role of indi-
viduals in Socialist legal theory.
Although individuals in the Soviet Union have not brought actions
under the tort articles of the law of obligations, Article 444 could be used
to minimize defective products and to compensate for the personal and
property damage they cause. Article 444 is "designed to encourage [state
managers of enterprises] to avoid fault in what they do, and to perform
efficiently by organizing production, transportation or the provision of
services in such a way that accidents are minimized. ' 134 The application
of Article 444 to recover for damage caused by defective products would
also be consistent with the principles of the Law on the State Enterprise,
under which enterprises will be economically responsible.
In addition, one United States commentator has suggested that Arti-
cle 454 could be used to create strict liability for defective products.
135
However, neither the list prepared by the Soviets nor the collections of
cases on this provision contain any examples of its application to defec-
tive products. 136 The policy of economic accountability underlying the
132 For a discussion of the role of the judiciary in civil law and socialist law systems, see J.
MERRYMAN, supra note 126, at 39-47; M. GLENDON, M. GORDON & C. OSAKWE, supra note 127,
at 747-90.
133 The role of the Supreme Soviet is discussed in M. GLENDON, M. GORDON & C. OSAKWE,
supra note 127, at 728-43.
134 J. HAZARD, MANAGING CHANGE IN THE U.S.S.R. 139 (1983).
135 Darby, supra note 15, at 185.
136 The two principal collections of cases on Soviet law in general and tort law in particular are J.
HAZARD, W. BUTLER & P. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 25, and J. HAZARD &
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Law on the State Enterprise supports the application of strict liability to
manufacturers for the damage their products cause consumers.1 37 Strict
liability would permit enterprises that satisfy consumer demands for
quality products to make a profit. Those whose products repeatedly
cause personal injury or property damage would go out of business.
Strict liability would also provide an incentive to workers to produce
quality products since their wages and the survival of their jobs would be
tied to the quality of the products they produced.
IV. CONCLUSION
Soviet attempts to restructure the domestic economy, and the new
laws that have been enacted to implement those policies, demonstrate the
nation's desire both to eliminate defective goods and to improve the qual-
ity of consumer goods manufactured in the Soviet Union. The transla-
tion of these policies and laws into an effective law of product liability,
however, will require overcoming the conflict that exists between the
laws and realities of Soviet society.
Despite the detailed contract provisions of the Soviet law of obliga-
tions, those provisions have failed to further either of the goals of prod-
uct liability. They have neither provided an effective remedy for
consumers or enterprises that purchase defective products nor served as
an incentive to manufacturers to improve the quality of the products they
manufacture and sell. The reasons for this lie in the realities of the eco-
nomic system. Application of the contract provisions in suits brought by
consumers or manufacturing enterprises would have seriously threatened
the central planning which is the heart of the Soviet economic system.
Not only would it have disrupted the quota system, it would have shifted
control over an important aspect of manufacturing (i.e., quality control)
from the bureaucracy to individuals. Such a fundamental alteration of
the economy and the role of the individual will not occur without the
consent of the government.
The tort articles have been even less helpful to individuals since they
do not deal specifically with personal injury and property loss caused by
defective products. While the language of Articles 444 and 454 could be
used for product liability cases, they have not been in the past. It is
doubtful whether they can be used in the future because the nature of the
Soviet legal system prevents the judicial expansion of existing principles
I. SHAPIRO, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM (1962). Neither of these collections contains any tort cases
dealing with defective products.
137 This policy is discussed in Full Economic Accountability, translated in 38 CURRENT DIG. SOy.
PRESS No. 51, Jan. 21, 1987, at 11.
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into new areas. Adequate remedies for personal injury and property
damage must come from the legislature.
While not specifically addressed to defective products, the Law on
the State Enterprise and Law on Individual Enterprise have raised the
quality of goods manufactured and sold by enterprises within the Soviet
Union or produced for export. The success of these laws will depend
upon how effective the government is in dealing with a number of factors
which have deep roots in Soviet economic history: 1) the emphasis on
military spending rather than civilian investment; 2) the rigid controls of
central planning; 3) inadequate incentives to motivate workers; 4) the
resistance of the bureaucracy to change; 5) the inexperience of factory
officials with market-oriented planning and decisionmaking; and 6) out-
dated equipment.
Whether the Soviet Union is successful in improving product quality
will ultimately depend upon the fate of the complex structure of eco-
nomic reform which includes serious political and economic risks. Politi-
cally, some critics have expressed dissatisfaction with the slow pace of
reform.138  Others have criticized those who want to keep the central
planning system but temper it with prices set by consumer demand, more
competition, and small-scale enterprises. These critics propose more reli-
ance on free markets as a solution to the country's economic problems.139
Gorbachev's reforms have also been challenged by those who feel that
they go too far and threaten the Party bureaucracy.4
Economically, the move toward a decentralized market-oriented
138 The most prominent critic of the slow pace of change was Boris N. Yeltsin, former head of the
Moscow Communist Party organization. See Aide Who Assailed Gorbachev's Pace Ousted in Mos-
cow, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1987, at Al, col. I [hereinafter Aide Ousted].
139 L. Popkova, an economist with an institute of the Soviet Academy of Science, has stated that
free markets promise more efficiency and greater abundance than central control. Her comments
have drawn attention both in the Soviet and Western press. See Where are the Pastries the Lightest?,
translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. SOy. PRESS No. 35, Sept. 30, 1987, at 9; Soviet Article Doubts
Economic Line, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1987, at 4, col. 4. For responses to Popkova's views, see Here's
What the Pastries Amount To, translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. SOV. PRESS No. 35, Sept. 30, 1987, at
10; Plan or Market, translated in 39 CURRENT DIG. SOy. PRESS No. 35, Sept. 30, 1987, at 10.
140 The wife of one senior party official wrote to a Moscow newspaper: "Don't snipe at us. We
are the elite and you cannot halt the stratification of society. You are not strong enough. We will
rip the puny sails of perestroika [reconstruction] and you will be unable to reach your destination."
After Yeltsin, Gorbachev?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1987, § 5, at 27, col. 2.
The removal of Boris Yeltsin in November 1987 is an example of the strength of those who
resist the restructuring of the Soviet economy and society. Although Yeltsin, a senior official who
had been appointed by Gorbachev, was criticized for "major shortcomings" of leadership, he was
also a critic of the party leadership and the slow pace of reform. Marshall Goldman has predicted
that "the Yeltsin affair may some day be seen as the first sign that Mikhail S. Gorbachev's efforts to
reform Soviet society and economic life would end in failure." Id. See also Aide Ousted, supra note
138; Excerpts From Moscow Speeches by Yeltsin and His Critics, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1987, at 6,
col.1; Gorbachev Accuses Former Ally of Putting Ambition Above Party, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1987,
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economy may result in a period of stagnation for the Soviet economy and
a growth rate of less than 2% for the rest of the decade.141 Although the
Net Material Product (the gross national product minus services and de-
preciation) rose by 3.5% in 1985 and 4.1% in 1986, a growth rate of only
about 2.5% in 1987 has been predicted.142 Part of this decline has been
attributed to the campaign against defective manufactured goods. 143
This decline, coupled with the threat to job security, a tougher work
ethic, stricter discipline, and bureaucratic opposition, could produce dis-
ruptions in the economy capable of threatening Gorbachev's leadership.
The need for protection from defective goods and the desire for higher
quality consumer goods, could be jeopardized. The real losers in such a
case would be the Soviet people.
at Al, col. 4;Excerpts from TassAccount of Gorbachev's Talk on Yeltsin, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1987,
at A12, col. 1.
141 This prediction is contained in a report written by the Central Intelligence Agency for the
Congressional Joint Economic Committee. See Glasnost is Seen Disrupting Soviet, N.Y. Times, Sept.
15, 1987, at A6, col. 4.
142 See Reforming, supra note 1, at 78.
143 At one tractor factory, for example, government quality-control inspectors rejected 15-20% of
the tractors. At other factories, they have been rejecting as much as 30% of the output. See A
Tractor Factory Tries to Pull Its Own Weight, Bus. WK., Dec. 7, 1987, at 79; Reforming, supra note
1, at 78.
